BASQUES, CATALANS, PRIMORDIALISM AND VIOLENCE

Jacques Lilli
Este ensayo trata de la violencia en los movimientos nacionalistas por medio de un estudio comparativo sobre el País Vasco y Cataluña en el marco de la España moderna. Una primera parte de naturaleza histórica está seguida de una parte teórica que presenta las variables que contribuyen a la violencia en el País Vasco. Aunque las estructuras sociales y la violencia a lo largo de la historia sean examinadas, la tesis principal concierne la inter-inteligibilidad. Así, la inter-inteligibilidad entre el catalán y el castellano permiten una evolución no violenta, especialmente en la asimilación de inmigrantes internos. La existencia de una organización terrorista autónoma en el País Vasco también es presentada como una variable explicativa. A manera de conclusión se sostiene que los nacionalistas Vascos deben modificar estructuralmente su concepción de la nacionalidad vasca.

This essay addresses the issue of violence in nationalist movements through a comparative study of the Basque region and Catalonia within the Spanish state. A description of the history of nationalism in both regions is followed by a theoretical section which pinpoints variables that contribute to violence in the Basque case. Whereas social structures and the history of violence are studied, the main thesis here is that the higher level of inter-intelligibility between Catalan and Castilian has allowed for a non-violent channelling of nationalistic tensions, notably in that it creates different patterns of assimilation of the in-migrants. Also, the existence of an autonomous terrorist organization is held to be responsible for violence. Finally, the need for the Basque nationalists to operate structural changes in their definition of nationality is presented.
INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this paper is to compare the nationalist movements in the Basque region and Catalonia, both within the Spanish state. The Spanish “counterexperience”\(^1\) is interesting on at least two accounts. First, it runs opposite to the predictions of modernization theorists, who argued that the trend in international politics was towards national and supra-national integration\(^2\). Second, Spain may be at the forefront of a Western-European trend for the XXIst century, and could well provide guidelines for Eastern Europe or Canada in the near future.

The comparison of the two cases is of interest also because of their different outcomes: I will pinpoint structural differences that I consider to be essential to explain the different patterns of the two forms of regional development. In doing so, I wish to provide some keys to understand why Catalonia has obtained substantial transfers of authority since the death of Franco in 1975 without resorting to violence, why the use of Catalan is constantly increasing among the population whatever its origin, and why Catalonia as a region is being successfully integrated in the European Community. In contrast, violence in the Basque region and the poor performance of the Basque language, shall be addressed.

The reason for choosing these two cases has to do with the advantage of studying, from a comparative perspective, two regions within the same institutional structure (the Spanish state) and a similar history. Many variables are thus controlled, which allows one to concentrate on other aspects of the different development between the two regions. This amounts to inverting Thomas Lancaster’s approach by modifying the controlled aspect of the study. Indeed, Lancaster\(^3\) contends that:

'A lack of a control group is a fundamental, at times almost fatal, flaw in the comparative study of peripheral nationalism.'

By choosing two groups within a common institutional structure, instead of a regional minority as he does (the Basques in Spain and France in his case), I intend to keep more variables controlled than would be otherwise (if the comparison were to concern Catalonia and Quebec, for instance). Another example of an approach similar to Lancaster is the one taken by Sahlins, who studies the development of boundaries and of national integration in Spain and France within a valley that is divided between the two countries\(^4\). This follows the

\(1\) See Vilar (1980):529

\(2\) For a critique of modernization theories, see Nairn (1990):30, or Geertz (1963):105-57

\(3\) See Lancaster (1987):563-4

\(4\) See Sahlins (1989)
“most-similar systems design”, “where the main features of the countries in question are close to identical, save the independent and dependent variables under investigation”\(^5\).

I must say that this paper is not intended to present a general theory of nationalist movements, or even a complete model. Rather, it aims rather to contribute to the current debate by presenting some variables that I consider important to the understanding of nationalism in Spain.

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It should be noted that Spanish scholars have concentrated their research mainly on the ideological aspects of peripheral nationalisms (and interestingly enough, most of them do not classify nationalism as an ideology\(^6\)). This creates an imbalance, since the social bases of nationalism, or the relationship between various peripheral nationalisms, and between central nationalism and peripheral nationalisms, are not often studied in Spain\(^7\). Rational-choice theories, social stratification or structures of ownership are almost unknown. This probably has to do, at least in part, with the lack of reliable data, something that Spanish scholars regularly point out\(^8\). The difficulty in obtaining reliable data has kept me from trying to link, for instance, structures of ownership and nationalism, or religious belonging and nationalism, etc., through more than approximative conclusions.

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In **Part I**, a broad overview of the historical evolution of the two regions is presented, with a mention of some authors who have addressed the issues. Part I is not intended to present a complete history of the two regions - something that has been done already - but to pinpoint some characteristics that might help to explain the different nationalist movements today.

**Part II** addresses the issue of the common or similar elements of the two regions, and the dissimilarities that might explain the different developments. It is divided in four sections: economics, language, demographics and history. I will present which variables I consider to be ‘controlled’, and which ones are not.

I contend that three variables play a key role in explaining the difference in violence of the two movements: the “inter-intelligibility” between the region and the dominant core, the “demographic equation” between immigrants and natives, and the existence of autonomous terrorist organizations.

Finally, the **Conclusion** is an extension of the theoretical perspective to other nationalist movements and a proposal for further research.

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5. See Bakvis-Chandler (1987): 7
7. Id.
I) A HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF THE BASQUE REGION AND CATALONIA: PRIMORDIAL VERSUS PRAGMATIC NATIONALISM?

This section is intended as a brief presentation of the history of the two regions, as well as a review of some authors who have written on their history and nationalist developments.

Most of the literature in the field is focused on one of the two regions. Thus, Clark, Da Silva, Douglass, Greenwood, Lancaster, Zuleika, De la Granja, Jauregui or de Pablo for instance, have written on the Basque region, whereas Laitin, Linz, Pi-Sunyer, Vilar, Da Cal, Mercade, Riqué or Aguilera del Prat have done research on the Catalan case. Stein Rokkan and Derek Urwin provide very useful comparisons between the two cases, although in a book of a more general endeavour. Linz undertakes a close comparison of the two regions. Finally, Lancaster and Lewis-Beck address the issue on regional vote support in Spain, which includes a strong comparative content. Yet, in spite of Beramendi and Máz’s contribution to the subject there is a lack of a comparative literature concentrating primarily on nationalist mobilization in the two regions. This lack of comparative literature is resented by Spanish scholars, as well as the lack of data on the social basis of nationalism.

A) The Basques: indomitable primordialism?

The “claim to ethnic uniqueness of the Basques”, as Douglass and Da Silva contend, is based on strong historical elements. Their language, which has not been possible to relate to any other, their blood type frequencies, as well as archaeological evidence suggest that “the Basque were in situ in the Pyrenees well before the subsequent invasions of Western Europe of Indo-European speaking tribes”. The immemorial time-span gives the Basque case a very special aura, that influences the Basque nationalist mobilization to this day. This can be seen in nationalist’s claim that the Basques are an ‘island-people’ (‘Pueblo Isla’), distinct from their environment and unique in the world.

Well before modern nationalism, the historical traces of ‘Basqueness’ date back for millennia, as the annals of Strabo or La Chanson de Roland prove. Foreign invaders, like Visigoth, Franks or Arabs were successfully repelled. Resistance to the Arab invasions - the

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10. See Linz (1985)
13. Id.
17. See Da Silva/Douglass (1971):151
18. See Linz (1973):80
only region in Spain to have done so - was to have considerable influence for the group's fate, since it is the origin of their claim to 'collective nobility'.

By the Xth century, the kingdom of Navarre covered most of today's Spanish and French Basque regions. Yet there was a tendency towards fragmentation and internal warfare that kept the Basques from uniting. During the XXth century, the Kingdom of Navarre was reduced to what amounts to the Spanish province Navarre and the department of Basse-Navarre in France. Present-day Alava and Guipuzcoa were absorbed by force into the Kingdom of Castille, and the province of Vizcaya came to be a part of Castille through a royal marriage.

The Northern part of the Basque region was under the orbit of Frankish kings (North), the Kingdom of Béarn (East), even England to the West. In 1590, Basse Navarre was finally annexed by the French Monarchy into what became the French Basque country. By 1659, the present-day border between Spain and France was set by the Treaty of the Pyrenees sealing the territorial fate of the Basque region in the modern era.

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On the political order, the XVIth and XVIIth centuries signified the end of political sovereignty for the Basques, who were granted a certain degree of autonomy by both France and Spain (under the form of Fueros in Spain, Fors in France). The degree of autonomy that this represented is the object of disagreements among different authors: thus, for Milton Da Silva and William Douglass this went as far as, “in some cases, the Basques (being treated) by the central power as a foreign government”, whereas for Stein Rokkan and Derek Urwin the Basques never enjoyed more than an ‘autonomist tradition’, as opposed to Catalonia’s ‘past independence’. What is certain (and I will adhere to Rokkan’s interpretation), is that the region conserved a certain degree of political autonomy, which comprised a large measure of home rule, and some degree of independence in foreign affairs.

The Basque political life was organized on an immemorial sort of ‘primitive peasant democracy’, that was respected - to the extent that it did not interfere with central interests - by both France and Spain until the XIXth century. Also, Basques were free from

20. See Greenwood (1977)
22. See Linz (1973):49
26. See Garcia Venero, Maximiliano (1945), Historia del nacionalismo vasco 1793-1936 cited in Da Silva/Douglass (1971)
27. See Gallop (1931)
taxation, customs duties and conscription into the army\textsuperscript{29}? The court of Navarra was allowed to function until the XIXth century, and a viceroy was sent from Madrid - a unique situation within the peninsula. Further, Basques on both sides of the border were allowed to enter agreements and to remain neutral wars between Spain and France. In some cases, they were allowed to send diplomatic emissaries abroad.

Until the middle of the XIXth century, the Basque region very much remained outside the mainstream of Spanish reality. Yet, as the Basque region evolved from a zone of geo-strategic importance to Spain into a (peripheral) geo-economic centre of a key importance, its privileges were successfully eroded by central governments\textsuperscript{30}. In the XIXth century, centralization increased along with tensions. The Basques were among the key actors in initiating the Carlist wars against Madrid. At the end of the first war (in 1839) they were promised that their traditional liberties would be respected, as long as this would not prejudice Spanish unity\textsuperscript{31}. By the 1870s civil war (the second and third Carlist wars) had erupted again with the Basques among the main initiators. The end result for the Basques was the loss of all foral privileges.

Carlism had represented a strategy of protecting Basqueness through violence in order to control the centre. After the end of the Carlist wars, all nationalist fights would be undertaken in order to gain control of the region alone. Also, the end of the Carlist wars left a standing army of occupation, a decimated country, and a campaign of intimidation directed at outlawing the Basque language.

**Modern Basque nationalism**

It is in these circumstances, strongly reminiscent of the ones that will prevail after 1939 (see later, p. 15), that modern Basque nationalism was born. At the end of the XIXth century, there was a rural exodus towards urban centres, as well as massive in-migration of Castilian-speaking workers from other parts of Spain. Basques became a minority in their own urban centres.

Modern Basque nationalism was therefore born as an urban phenomenon. In these circumstances, Sabino Arana was the founder of the modern Basque nationalist movement. In his book Bizkaya por su independencia he coined the word ‘Euzkadi’ to refer to an independent Basque nation. He advocated the expulsion of all French and Spanish people from Basque soil, not without racist overtones (e.g., he condemned inter-marriage with non-Basques\textsuperscript{32}). Hatred towards anything Spanish is also a recurrent element in his writings\textsuperscript{33}. Although Arana’s ideas knew several phases and have prompted different, sometimes contradictory, interpretations, we may say that his main thesis - which was to influence all subsequent Basque nationalism - was based on three central themes. First, the

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\textsuperscript{29} See Altamira (1949):336

\textsuperscript{30} See Rokkan/Urwin (1983):129-31

\textsuperscript{31} See Beramendi/Máiz (1991):111

\textsuperscript{32} See Jáuregui (1991):44, note 93

\textsuperscript{33} Id (1981):27
exclusion of voluntarist or ‘Jacobinist’ factors from the definition of nations in favour of, second, race seen as the fundamental constitutive element of national identity. Third and finally, all patriotic and political activity was to be subordinated to Catholic religion. The latter was understood as a natural consequence of the Basque’s early monotheism, a very solid myth among Basque nationalists. Concerning the in-migrants from other parts of Spain, Arana advocated racial separation.

Arana viewed the situation in the Basque region as similar to the one in the colonies that were fighting for independence from Spain during those years (Cuba, Philippines, Morocco). He saw a basic incompatibility between the Spanish and Basque peoples, since Spain is perceived as undemocratic, imperialistic and militaristic, whereas the Basque’s main characteristics are democratic, anti-imperialistic and anti-militaristic. Language is at the core of this incompatibility, around which form customs. The Basque customs and traditions are embodied in the ‘Old Law’ (‘Lagi Zara’).

The response to his thesis was favourable among the urban middle-classes, students and the Basque clergy, whereas the rural areas, which were idealized by Arana as the truly ‘pure’ Basques, remained apathetic. Basque industrialists, closely linked to Madrid, were opposed to Basque nationalism.

At his death in 1903, after repeated terms in prison, Arana became a martyr. Most importantly, he had laid the bases, in 1893-1894, of the Partido Nacionalista Vasco (P.N.V.), a nationalist party that encountered important electoral success between 1903-1923 (in 1923, Primo de Rivera’s dictatorship was installed). Immediately prior to his death, Arana’s ideas had shifted towards a ‘Spanish option’ (‘evolución españolista de Arana’), a more conciliatory tone towards the authorities in Madrid. The ‘Spanish option’ were to create many disagreements within the nationalist movement.

The P.N.V., and the nationalist movement at large, was divided over what degree of independence to aim for, ranging from statehood to a foral system similar to the one that had prevailed until the XIXth century. Another division occurred concerning whether demands for autonomy should be used as a means to ultimately attain independence (something which the PNV regularly declares to this day).

34. Id:21
35. Id.
37. Id:44
38. Id:134
40. See Jauregui (1991):18
41. Id. (1981):33
42. See the excellent paper on the subject by De la Granja (1991) in Beramendi (1991):101-125; for the official programme of the PNV, see id:108
43. See De la Granja:124, note 79
Parallel to political developments, a cultural revival was taking place: folklore, linguistics, archaeology, were part of a movement of extreme vitality. An element common to the different disciplines was the praise of rural life, especially within the urban movements. Rural life was considered as less ‘corrupted’, the depositary of true ‘Basqueness’.

After 1923, the dictatorship of Primo de Rivera forced the movement to become clandestine until the establishment of the Republic in 1931, when it re-entered the political scene. Jose Antonio Aguirre provided strong leadership, as well as a strategy geared towards action in the Madrid Cortes in order to achieve autonomy. This was not achieved in 1932 when, despite the autonomy statute granted to Catalonia, no different status was obtained for the Basque region. Only in 1936, shortly before the Civil war, was a statute granted, in what was to be the short-lived Government of Euzkadi (9 months in 1936-7). In August 1937 a Basque Republic was symbolically declared.

It is worth noting the role of the Catholic clergy within Basque modern nationalism: the young clergy from the Basque region was closely linked to nationalists, and represented the only Basque-speaking segment of society which was educated. This is a probable legacy of Carlism, a movement which was both heavily Catholic and pro-Basque (in the sense of a reinstatement of Basque distinctiveness through the Fueros) in the XIXth century, and which stagnated at the end of the last Carlist war (which ended in 1876). Very briefly put, the Carlist party slowly lost its members and voters to the PNV, in part thanks to Arana’s heavily religious understanding of Basque nationalism. For Arana, God and the Basque nation were inseparable realities.

In spite of the nationalist movement’s close relationship with the Church, the PNV backed the liberal government of the Frente Popular in the 30s and opposed the Francoist rebellion from the very beginning of the war, notwithstanding the strong pressure from the Vatican and the Church in Madrid. This was accepted without reserve by the numerous clergymen and strongly religious members of the Party. A tentative interpretation of this phenomenon could be that, following Jauregui’s own interpretation, the nationalist sense of belonging would prove stronger than the religious sense of belonging to the Catholic Church’s hierarchy. Thus the PNV backed the Azaña-led Spanish regime because it is more apt to grant the autonomy statute that it desired, instead of the pro-centralist and pro-Franco Spanish Church and the Vatican.

Although the PNV proposed the separation between State and Church in its statutes, tensions over the issue of Church/State relations were an issue within the PNV, so that there

44. See Douglass-Zulaika (1990):244, De la Granja.122
45. See Real Cuesta (1985):225-6
47. Id
48. See Jáuregui (1981):21
49. Id:20
50. Id
was a schism in 1930, and a clearly non-confessional faction entitled ANV separated from the main current. The ANV faction had an influence on ETA, later in the 1950’s.

Jauregui posits the same for class-struggles, which disappear when the nationalist element comes into play (he does so in the manner of approximative generalizations (‘aventurar conclusiones’), since the data is unreliable. He points out that the Basque region was highly industrialized after the turn of the century, and that a correlation can be seen between industrialization and nationalism. Nationalism was a matter of urban and industrial centres.

Also, he suggests that nationalism adapted perfectly to this new situation: nationalism can be considered up to about 1900 to be a conservative force, linked to the pre-industrial society, socialism was then the ideology adapted to the industrial reality. After that date nationalism undertakes a supra-classist approach that involves the Basque proletariat, leaving the Castilian-speaking in-migrants outside of its boundaries and even rejecting them.

This created a double tension in the Basque region, which was to have, to this day, a heavy influence on Basque nationalist reality. A first tension concerns the Spanish/Euzkadi opposition, whereas the second involves the autochthon community against the in-migrants. As we shall see later, I believe this double tension to be one of the origins of violence in the Basque region through the non-integration of in-migrants.

During the civil war, the Basque country suffered severe losses, with the bombing of Guernica standing as a symbol of other atrocities. After the Civil war (1936-39), ferocious repression was orchestrated against the Basque nationalist movement: again, an army of occupation was left in the region and the language prohibited. The Basque government was exiled in Paris, the P.N.V. operated in the French Basque country, and most activists were either in prison or exiled.

The German invasion of France came as a blow to the movement, forcing it to exile in Latin America, where the wealthy Basque business elite provided important resources to the movement. The government in exile was transferred to Buenos Aire. At the end of World War II, the movement resumed operations in France, with its government based in Paris again.

The movement counted on Franco’s isolation from the international community to allow for a rapid change of government. The whole strategy of the movement between 1945 and 1951 was directed at re-entering the region as soon as Franco would step down from power, and resume the pre-civil war quest for autonomy/independence. In 1951, when the United

51. On ETA’s non-confessional programme, see Jauregui (1981):131,193
52. See Jauregui (1981):230, 239, 253
53. Id:244
54. See Jauregui (1981):143, who compares the Basque exiles to the Jewish diaspora
States recognized Franco’s regime, the movement was forced to change its strategy. This signifies the beginning of a period of stagnation, of which the nationalist movement will only emerge through a generational change, embodied by ETA in as of the late 1950s.

ETA enters the scene:

The leadership of the nationalist movement, which depended on conservative milieux for its funding, had become ‘increasingly conservative and more given to moderation in its actions’\(^\text{55}\). The decade of the 1950s is marked by ‘decay and indecisiveness in the leadership ranks’\(^\text{56}\), and many leaders either died or left the movement.

Parallel to this tendency, the youth group of the P.N.V. (‘Eusko Gaztedi’) became more radicalized and active. They showed a sense of urgency and of exasperation towards the inaction and pessimism of their predecessors\(^\text{57}\). All their actions were characterized by what they perceived as the rapid death of the Basque nation, which required urgent action if anything was to be achieved. They first met as a study group of Basque history, then founded ETA (Euzkadi ta Azkatasuna = Euzkadi and Freedom) in 1959.

In a first period between 1959 and 1962, the group did not advocate violence, although the famous ‘sixth section’ (in charge of armed actions) existed from the beginning\(^\text{58}\). The first series of actions were robberies in order to find the funding that the PNV denied them. Also, they intimidated contributors to the P.N.V. and carried out their first terrorist actions, carefully planned so as not to take human lives. Their first important armed action happened in July 1962, a carefully planned bombing of a train, such that there were no dead or wounded. The reaction of the central government was so harsh, however, that the organization almost disintegrated\(^\text{59}\).

After the period of repression, a debate over the use of violent (deadly) means to achieve independence arose among the group\(^\text{60}\). Many claimed that, since the central government’s means were violent, violence represented bringing the fight to its own terrain. This debate lasted until 1963, when a successful ten-minute strike, partially organized by ETA, prompted another blow of harsh repression that almost meant the end of the organization. After this, violence is considered to be the only way to success, and a close relation between the military strategy of the organization and its ideology is evident\(^\text{61}\).

\(^{55}\) See Da Silva/Douglass (1971):165

\(^{56}\) Id

\(^{57}\) See Jáuregui:92-3

\(^{58}\) Id:136

\(^{59}\) Id:137: see note 127

\(^{60}\) See Jáuregui (1981):204-37; he consecrates a whole chapter to the disagreements within the organization over the use of violence

\(^{61}\) See Jáuregui (1981):219
Contemporary to ETA’s actions, Da Silva and Douglass point out the ‘largely independent acceleration of resistance among Basque (young) clergymen’ against their superiors (who were approved by France). This was, for France, a more serious problem than ETA, since the relation with the Church and the Vatican was essential to the stability of the regime. This can be, again, interpreted as a situation in which the nationalist attachment of that sector of the Basque church took precedence over their attachment to the Madrid-based, and closely associated with France, Church hierarchy.

By the end of the 1960s ETA conducted its first deadly actions, targeted mainly at the police (Guardia Civil), composed mostly of Castilian-speakers and perceived as an army of occupation. This was followed by the imposition of martial law in Guipúzcoa and Vizcaya. Members of ETA were convicted, sometimes in dubious circumstances.

Needless to say, these attacks continued and even increased after Franco’s death in 1975, followed by the democratization of the Spanish state and the achievement of a statute of autonomy, which comprises a regional police, control over cultural affairs. Douglass-Zulaika and Jauregui point out that ETA brought three key contributions to Basque nationalism: First, it declared the separation between the Church and the movement (‘aconfessionalism’). Second, it rejected race as a basis of Basqueness, in favour of a definition based on the commitment to the Basque language and cultural ideals. This was the equivalent of integrating the descendants of non-Basques who were willing to become Basques, and could be interpreted as a ‘passage from primordialism to nationalism’ as described by Linz. Finally, ETA advocated the creation of an independent socialist Basque state without an intermediate stage of autonomy.

The point concerning the integration of in-migrants is certainly central to understanding violence, and shows a contradiction in the organization’s strategy. For, as Jauregui points out in spite of the declarations for the assimilation of immigrants, which presupposes an acceptance of the industrial character of the Basque society, the model that ETA advocates in its strategy is the ‘Third world’ one, which entails that the Basque society is at a pre-industrial level. Fully accepting the necessity of integrating in-migrants, Jauregui justly contends, would have entailed accepting the industrial reality of the Basque society.

Concerning the relationship between ETA and the rest of the nationalists, it must be noted that the cleavage between the P.N.V. and ETA deepened during the 1960s especially since ETA had definitely turned towards the (extreme) left of the political spectrum, which is a clear departure from the ‘classical’ modern Basque nationalism as founded by Arana.

62. See Douglass/Zulaika (1990):166
63. Id:244-5
64. See Jáuregui (1981):87 and 131-3
65. See Linz (1985)
67. Id:225
68. See the platform of the PNV, in Garcia Venero, 244-5, translated into English in Da Silva/Douglass (1971):181-2
Despite the cleavages between the PNV and ETA, it can be argued that their relationship is one of ‘mutual convenience’: notably, the PNV has the possibility, in negotiations with Madrid or in campaigns within the Basque region, of arguing something on the lines that ‘it is either us, or ETA’s violence’.

The organization itself was also the centre of strong disagreements over strategies and goals ETA experienced two major schisms. First, in 1966, one group argued that working-class struggle was prevalent over Basque nationalism, with another faction advocating Basque independence as the primary goal. A third and successful (in gaining control of ETA) faction advocated postponing any debate until liberation was achieved.

A second schism, of which the consequences last to this day, happened on the eve of the death of Franco in 1975: ETA politico-militar (ETApm) advocated a mixture of armed resistance and political negotiation, while ETA militar (ETAm) exclusively favoured armed resistance until independence was attained.

Although many authors posit the fact that ETA had an ‘anti-France’ reason to exist, and that repression was one of the main variables of violence, we shall see that (1) repression was of a comparable scope and level within Catalonia, and (2) that once Franco died, violence continued as before. Therefore, we may posit that, if Franco’s repressive regime had an influence on violence in the Basque case, it must have been through a combination with other variables.

After Franco’s death, a constitutional state was instituted, with provisions for substantial transfers of authority to the regions (notably the Basque region and Catalonia), a statute of autonomy, and offers of amnesty for members of ETA willing to re-enter civilian life. Yet ETA has continued its terrorist actions, despite calls to the contrary from the PNV and the population (Basque and non-Basque) of the region. It is the second-bloodiest terrorist movement within one Western state after the IRA.

Before turning to some interpretations of this phenomenon, I shall now present nationalism in Catalonia.

B) Catalonia: pragmatic nationalism?

For Pierre Vilar, the dean of the historians of Catalonia, Catalans had distinctive characteristics from the beginning, including race, religion and territory. Laitin considers

70. See Douglass-Zuleika (1990):246
71. See Jáuregui:311,319,368
72. See Jáuregui:215,460
73. Id:214
74. See Vilar (1980)
75. See Laitin (1989):297
that Catalonia has ‘all the “objective” conditions to have warranted its development into a modern nation-state’ (i.e., language, history and territory). Next, a glorious and distinctive history starts in the early middle ages, when the Catalans ruled over territories as far as Greece.

The highest level of Catalan expansion in the middle-ages comes under Jaume I (1213-76) who expanded Catalan rule as far as Mallorca, Valencia and Murcia. During the XIIIth century, Catalonia has its own representative institutions: the Generalitat (created in 1359) held by Vilar to be the precursor of the modern republican state in Europe, as well as a flourishing literature and art, which is not unlike the movement in Occitania and Aquitaine on the other side of the Pyrenees.

Most authors also point to Catalonia’s long tradition of political liberty, embodied by what is considered by some as the oldest Parliament in the world, the ‘Diputació’\(^76\). Yet the key variable for Vilar is the language\(^77\), an approach taken also by Rokkan and Urwin\(^78\). Vilar evokes the lessening role of Catalan after the XVth century, parallel to the emergence of Spain as a world power. Later, in the XIXth century, the use of Catalan increased, while the power of Spain decreased. For Vilar, this is not an indication that Catalan nationalism was dominated by economic interests: what matters is that the Catalans have refused to forget their language throughout the centuries\(^79\). For him, language is the principal agent of a crystallization out of which Catalan nationalism is born or reborn.

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I will roughly follow Vilar’s division of the history of Catalonia from the XVth century to 1936 in four periods.

From the end of the XVth century to the beginning of the XIXth century, the use of Catalan decreased, and Catalonia ‘lost the factors that made up its strength (...) at the same time that Castile was forging the tools of its mastery of the world’\(^80\). In 1712, Philip V dissolved the ‘Principat’ of Catalonia, which could be considered as the end of Catalonia as an independent entity from Spain.

From 1720 to 1808, the development of capital in Catalonia was ‘based less on ruin than elsewhere’\(^81\), especially if one considers Catalonia’s Mediterranean geographic position\(^82\). This was probably the origin of the importance of the middle-class throughout Catalan history\(^83\), and it gave Catalonia an unusual ownership structure if compared to other

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76. See Linz (1973):39-40
77. See Vilar (1980):572-3
78. See Rokkan/Urwin (1983):69
79. See Vilar (1980):573
80. Id:577
81. Id:568
82. See Linz (1973):39-40
83. See Pi-Sunyer (1985):116-7
Mediterranean societies. The latter are characterized by a small rural aristocracy, and a vast majority of agricultural workers do not own any land\textsuperscript{84}. Moreover, Catalonia is not a highly hierarchical, centralized or personalistic society\textsuperscript{85}, a fact which offers strong similarities with the Basque region in this respect.

There is a low level of conflict with Madrid during this “long wave of Charles III”, in spite of the generalization of the use of Castilian\textsuperscript{86}, and the relegation of Catalan to a lower-level dialect, used in private conversations only. Yet in spite of this situation of ‘diglossia’\textsuperscript{87}, Castilian never became hegemonic in Catalonia\textsuperscript{89} because the population at large kept using it for private communication.

Catalans actively participated in the activities associated with the Empire, where they had strong interests. They refused to collaborate with the French during the invasions of 1794 and 1808, something that both Vilar\textsuperscript{88} and Rokkan and Urwin consider as an indication that Catalans started to become Spaniards during that period. Also, it is very important to see that the integration of the bourgeoisie into the national property structure, by means of the Empire, played a key role in this state of affairs, while Madrid accepted the development of this peripheral bourgeoisie\textsuperscript{89}.

\textbf{1820-1855:}

This period is termed ‘regionalist protectionist’ by Vilar. It reflects the aspirations, without success in practice, of the local ruling classes to the leadership of the whole of the Spanish state. For Catalans, the ‘nation’ becomes the Spanish nation, while Catalonia is (only) the ‘fatherland’ of the Catalans.

The quest for leadership is crystallized over the issue of protectionism: Catalonia, as the most industrialized part of Spain, sought a protectionist policy for Spain and the Empire, so as to protect its industry. The Spanish response (in Madrid) was a violent one. The gravest confrontations took place during the two colonial crises of 1810-23 and 1885-98. It was during this period that the ‘stereotype’ of the Catalan (in the rest of Spain) was born. According to the stereotype Catalans are greedy and want to rule Spain in their own interest, a stereotype that lasts to this day.

Finally, the Spanish nobility is very contemptuous of the bourgeois origins and activities of the Catalan leadership\textsuperscript{90}. This, I believe, caused the Catalan elite to turn away from integration in the Spanish elite.

\textsuperscript{84} For a study of Mediterranean societies, see Davis (1977)
\textsuperscript{85} See Vilar (1980):118
\textsuperscript{86} Id:568
\textsuperscript{87} See Ferguson (1959):325-340; Laitin (1989):309
\textsuperscript{88} See Vilar (1980):570
\textsuperscript{89} Id:571
\textsuperscript{90} Id:563-4
Starting with the second set of colonial crises, between 1885 and 1898, the Catalan elite (which had aspired to the leadership of the Spanish state without success) gradually turned away from the goal (of national leadership) to that of regional autonomy. As Laitin writes\textsuperscript{91}:

‘the coup de grâce came with Spain's loss to the United States of the War of 1898, after which Catalan industrialists lost their most valuable protected markets in Cuba and the Philippines’.

1885-1931:

With the second colonial crisis (1885-98), the decline of Spain became more and more evident. In Catalonia, this state of affairs was greatly resented. An intense historical nostalgia of former Catalan imperialism develops into the ‘Renaixença’ (increased use of the language, artistic production in Catalan, poetry competitions at the ‘Jocs florals’) and ‘Catalanisme’ (which demanded autonomy for the region). The use of Catalan spread back throughout the population, especially for official purposes, ending the acceptance of the state of diglossia that earlier prevailed.

After Primo de Rivera’s coup d’etat in 1923, the intellectual elite, the economic leaders, the middle-classes and the workers (which counted a high rate of Castilian-speakers), according to Vilar\textsuperscript{92} shared in the nationalist movement. This is interpreted as a circumstantial union against Primo de Rivera, who was strongly opposed to regional particularisms and working class organization. When Primo de Rivera was deposed in 1931, polarization occurred between the proletariat and the rest of the Catalan movement.

1931-6

During this period, Catalonia achieved the highest level of independence of its modern history: in 1932, a statute of autonomy with substantial powers was obtained (it was supported by 75% of the population\textsuperscript{93}. Later in 1932, a regional government (the ‘Generalitat’) was created, with all the powers of state except foreign affairs and defense. A Catalan Parliament was elected, with a leftist majority. To Catalans, this period is considered as ‘some kind of golden age’\textsuperscript{94}, especially considering that most classes and sectors of society were associated with the process\textsuperscript{95}. It is interesting to note that such developments were denied to the Basque region (except very briefly at the beginning of the Civil War, in 1936).

Concerning the situation of the Catholic Church in Catalonia, Francesc Mercadé\textsuperscript{96} points to the very ‘intense, dynamic relationship’ (the translation is mine) between the clergy and the nationalist movement in the 30’s. From the start, he argues, the ‘social Catholic’ movement

\textsuperscript{91} See Laitin (1989):300

\textsuperscript{92} See Vilar (1980):539

\textsuperscript{93} See Beramendi:232

\textsuperscript{94} See Pi-Sunyer (1971):124

\textsuperscript{95} See Beramendi:231

\textsuperscript{96} See Mercadé (1991):97
confronted directly the issues that arose as a result of industrialization: working-class integration, youth living-conditions, women’s liberation. This movement showed, according to the author, clear autonomist inclinations, as well as a support for trade unions. Finally, he summarizes the movement’s importance around five issues: (1) the emphasis on the social dimension of Catholicism, (2) the defense of nationalism as a sense of identity, (3) a liberal, pro-democratic line of thought (4) the defense of cultural liberalism, since the Church ran a big portion of the school system and (5) the quest for a ‘third way’, neither capitalist nor socialist.

This sector of the Catholic Church provided a link between nationalists and the Republican regime in Madrid, while facilitating the integration of in-migrants by both criticizing capitalism and its excesses, and linking the in-migrants to the nationalist movement and calling for their integration. Its rejection of socialism played also a role in its not being seen as a threat by any sector of society, thus allowing it to act without major hindrances. This explains also (in part at least) the close support that the Catalan nationalists provided to the Republican government of Azàña all through the 30s and during the civil war.

In 1936, the Spanish civil war erupted, bringing the end of all autonomy. During the Civil War, Catalonia was the Republican stronghold, and the region suffered heavily during and after the war. The Republican defeat brought a period of harsh political, cultural and linguistic repression until at least the mid-60s. It was only then that regulations were loosened and loopholes appeared for Catalans to resume usage of their language, cultural and folkloric activities, and in some cases political meetings. The upper classes, once again, turned away from using Catalan even at the family level.

If one considers the period of cultural or national ‘reawakening’ in the 1970s it is evident that many developments in Catalonia were opposite to the Basque pattern, which was marked by increasing violence and the existence of ETA.

As Pi-Sunyer points out, there were during the 60s three levels of cultural affirmation in Catalonia: first, an essentially symbolic use of recognized cultural idioms while speaking Spanish or, more obviously, Catalan. Second, a more formal organizational commitment such as the ‘penyas’ (tine-clubs, outing clubs, etc) which allowed political activities under the cover of some different purported aim. Finally, some organizations operated underground and were legally proscribed. Of the latter, none resorted to killings. While the most extreme one, ‘Terra Lliura’ (‘free land’) has carried out some terrorist actions, none of these entailed deaths.

After the death of Franco in 1975, the institutional evolution has been parallel to that of the Basque region: Catalan was allowed again in the public sphere, and became the co-official language of the region. A myriad of newspapers and publications have

97. id:99
98. See Riquer i Permanyer (1991):236
99. See Pi-Sunyer (1971):127
demonstrated the vitality of Catalan cultural activity. Regional political parties and organizations have participated in elections with success. Under the Constitution of 1978, Catalonia has an autonomy statute, elects a regional government and Parliament, has a regional police, and has successfully integrated within the European Community by becoming one of its most dynamic regions.

Since 1978, Catalan nationalism has reflected a high degree of pragmatism in its projects, stressing the need to deal with reality as it is rather than as it should be. The integration of in-migrants is therefore perceived as a necessary step if Catalonia is to have real independence. Recent polls show a stress of pragmatic aspects of nationalism among the population at large. In the words of two well-known Catalan nationalists (the translation is mine):

‘Obviously, not a total and unlimited independence... We will not be able to become as independent as other European nations are today. Not because we will aspire to be second or third-level states, but rather because in the E.C. framework states will be partially deflated... In this context, independence will not be prioritarily defined as the absolute opposite of dependence. It will rather consist in the possibility for a country to deal freely with its own dependencies, without the latter being previously and unilaterally imposed. The right to independence is, therefore, the right to decide in a free and responsible manner. The right to count in the decisions... The right to have rights.’

All these developments (1) have taken place without significant levels of violence, and (2) show an ever-increasing level of the usage of Catalan, even among the Castilian speakers. It is to explain these developments that the next part is intended, by drawing both on a structural and historical analysis.

II) SOME TENTATIVE KEYS TO UNDERSTAND VIOLENCE AND INTEGRATION: INTER-INTELLIGIBILITY, DEMOGRAPHICS AND AUTONOMOUS GROUPS

In this part, I will propose some interpretations of the different modes of nationalist movements in the two regions, especially since the end of the Spanish civil war (1939). The common elements to the two regions will be highlighted, in an attempt to isolate the

100. For a study of Spanish electoral politics, see Lancaster and Lewis-Beck (1989)

101. See Estradé/Treserra (1991):154. In page 180, they contend that (the translation is mine):

‘Summing up, we shall affirm that what is needed is a more instrumental and not so essentialist nationalism. A nationalism that will know how to draw a national project more worried about the diverse realities that conform the country as it is rather than maintaining the sacred flame of patriotic purism. Which will depart from the present and accepts the challenge of constructing a credible future starting from the current conditions. And that will not be a mere nostalgic exercise to recreate remembrances or confine itself in the historic past in search for collective vibrations that are today difficult to experience. A plural and up-to-date nationalism (...) which will procure concrete enhancement for the concrete people who live in this country. A nationalism, in conclusion, that will make possible the effective and affective adhesion to the country not so much for sentimental, aesthetic or folkloric values, (…), as per eminently practical reasons…’

102. Id:184

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independent variables that would account for the level of violence in the Basque case, as well as its low rate of integration of Castilian-Speaking immigrants when compared to Catalonia.

Following Rokkan’s approach, I will consider both economic and cultural aspects of nationalist mobilization. I believe, as he does, that ‘identity is much more part of the cultural dimension’ and will therefore put forward an analysis that favours cultural variables. Linz also cautions against ‘underestimat(ing) the importance of the cultural and historicist revival’ made by interpretations that lean on the economic variables.

The variables that are presented here belong to four areas: economics, language-culture, demographics and the history of violence.

A) Economics: the contrary of internal colonies

Both regions have had, and presently have, strong economies within the Spanish state, achieving higher rates of industrialization, absolute and per capita income, and other indicators, than the rest of the country. This is contrary to Hechter’s theory of ‘internal colonies’. The internal colony argument states that the regional minority is exploited by the core of the state; its resources and economy provide labour and certain staples to the core. Its inhabitants, as a consequence of this situation, have lower living standards than the core, higher rates of unemployment, etc.: they are exploited much in the same way that a colonial power would exploit its colonies. Instead, Catalonia and the Basque region present a situation that is similar to the one that Helene Carrère d’Encausse described in Le Grand Frère for Russia within the USSR and Eastern Europe: an economically backwards centre (Madrid in this case) which politically and militarily dominates the (economically) more advanced peripheries.

One could even argue that, in spite of nationalists’ positions in both regions, their economic situation has been so advanced because of their belonging to the Spanish state. For example in-migration (see later, part C) has certainly provided most of the labour necessary to both region’s economic growth, in spite of nationalists’ lack of acknowledgment of this fact.

Without necessarily invalidating Hechter’s theory, this points to the role of the perceived economic situation of a minority: both Catalans and Basques often voice their region’s position as ‘milk cows’ of the Spanish state. Whether this is true or not, whether the

104. See Linz (1973):81
106. See Hechter (1974)
108. See Pi-Sunyer (1971) .120
situation of Catalonia and the Basque region is better because of their belonging to the Spanish state or not, what matters is then the myth behind the perception. Therefore, if the minorities perceive that they would be better off by not belonging to the Spanish state than inside it, then their economic situation might become a variable in nationalist movements.

This leads some authors to argue that, in a more prosperous and efficient Spain, there might not have been a regional-nationalist movement. Ortega y Gasset also pointed out the backwardness of the Spanish state, which made it easier for the peripheries to turn away from it. Yet his theories also posited the 'egoism' of the peripheries. In a simpler manner, Sahlins puts this in the words of a French Catalan who resignedly explains the reason for their (French Catalans) lack of mobilization when compared to their Spanish counterparts:

'You all, you can be catalanistes! Your government in Madrid treats you very badly. We cannot be (catalanistes) since our government in Paris treats us very well. We ask for a road, they build it right away. We want a telegraph, they put one in. We ask for a school, they give us one. We can not be catalanistes, but you, you can be catalanistes.'

Moreover, one can say that both regions have a similar geo-economic situation (economic centres, geographic peripheries). For Rokkan and Urwin, they also have in common the fact of being external peripheries that became interface peripheries because of in-migration.

Yet there is one key difference that concerns the internal economic structure of both regions. In Catalonia there is a strong middle-class that is linked to a business elite that has always remained Catalan and spoken Catalan, and established few links with Madrid. In the Basque region the polarization is a three-cornered one: between a local urban proletariat, heavily Castilian-speaking; a rural class of Basque small land-ownership; and an upper-class of Basque industrialists that is closely linked to Madrid.

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110. On the role of myth in nationalist movements, see Petrella (1980)


112. See Beramendi (1991):35. He also deplores the ‘arcaic nationalism’:

'considero como una de las desdichas más graves que han acontecido en la vida política durante los últimos años es que el regionalismo apareciera por vez primera tenido ya de lo que es más opuesto a él: de un arcaísmo regionalista'

He continues to make the most interesting point of his theory of nationalism:

'La solución de este problema, el del nacionalismo, no es cuestión de una ley, ni de dos leyes, ni siquiera de un Estatuto. El nacionalismo requiere un alto tratamiento historico; los nacionalismos sólo pueden deprimirse cuando se envuelven en un gran movimiento ascensional de todo un país, cuando se crea un gran Estado (...) Un Estado en decadencia fomenta los nacionalismos: un Estado en buena Ventura los desnutre y los reabsorbe'


115. The latter has been the target of many terrorist attacks from ETA. I also should point out here the lack of reliable data, which makes it very difficult to try to draw a model of nationalism on its social basis. See Jáuregui (1980):406; this remark is regularly made by Spanish scholars, cf. the introduction to Beramendi and Máiz (1991).
This polarization has in turn made most extremist groups appear on the left of the political scale, rendering it a difficult option for middle-class Basques. Also, it has increased the level of violence by radicalizing the nationalist groups: the nationalist struggle became a part of a class-struggle to form a Marxist-Leninist state once independence was attained. In Catalonia, nationalist movements are both from the left and the right, thus integrating the nationalist aspect of politics better throughout the political spectrum. The nationalist aspect of the political game is better disseminated throughout the political spectrum in the Catalan case.

B) Language and culture: the weight of inter-intelligibility

It is common to point out that language is the most significant of cultural variables. Thus Rokkan and Urwin argue that:

‘While language is only one of several expressions of identity, it is the most pervasive and obvious stigma of distinctiveness’

I also will concentrate on language, although not to the exclusion of everything else. It can be pointed out that both regions have strong and distinctive cultures, and that none of the two regions has a dominant world language. The issue of dominant world-languages deserves more research than has been the case, although it obviously cannot be addressed for the Basque and Catalan cases.

Apart from the fact that both have distinctive languages, and that they both do not have a dominant world language, the linguistic aspects of the Basque region and Catalonia present great dissimilarities, some of which might indicate that the Basque language is doomed. They provide, as we shall see, for hatred and panic in the Basque case, while attitudes need not reach such extremes in the Catalan case.

On absolute and relative levels of proficiency, Catalan presents a (much) better performance than Basque. Although completely reliable data is difficult to obtain, it can be pointed out that at the most 1/5 of the overall population in the Basque provinces is proficient in Basque, 1/3 of all ethnic Basques. It can be said that ‘the Basque language faces the possibility of extinction within several generations’. On the contrary, the level of proficiency is well over 50% in Catalonia, and shows signs of a constant improvement even among the non-Catalan population.

117. See Rokkan/Urwin (1983):136
118. See Linz (1974)
119. See Clark (1980); Lancaster (1987):570-4
120. See Lancaster (1987):570
121. See Rokkan/Urwin (1983):156
122. See Estrade (1991):59,83
I will follow Rokkan’s ‘rules of thumb’ to explain that:

’an ethnically distinctive subject territory is more likely to lose its separate linguistic identity: (a) the later the establishment of a unified standard of written communication in the territorial language; (b) the greater the differences in resources between periphery and central territory; (c) the earlier the development of a common labour market for both central and peripheral areas and the greater the opportunities for migration into the central language community; (d) the greater the likelihood of immigration into the periphery in response to opportunities created by the discovery and development of economic resources’.

I will concentrate on rules (a) and (b) within this section, and will deal with rules (c) and (d) in section C.

Two sets of reasons can therefore be put forward in order to explain the different performances of Catalan and Basque: (a) historical, concerning the languages themselves and (b) structural, related to their relationship with Castilian. (a) In a very simplified account of Rokkan and Urwin’s model, we might say that he posits that the printing press and the script sealed the chances of survival of peripheral languages. Thus Rokkan/Urwin write that:

‘the chances of survival of a peripheral language were severely reduced if it had not been standardized and had not become a medium of mass communication before the take-off of industrial development’

This partly accounts for the different performances of both languages, since standardization of Basque came with Arana at the end of the XIXth century, whereas Catalan was standardized as early as the XV-XVIth century.

(b) There is another set of variables that may account for a peripheral language’s performance: inter-intelligibility. Inter-intelligibility can be defined as the ‘distance’ (measured in the degree of difficulty of understanding the other language) between the peripheral and central languages. It is obvious that Basque presents a much lower level of inter-intelligibility than Catalan.

Catalan’s higher level of inter-intelligibility with Castilian than Basque has enhanced its chances of survival in at least two ways: (A) in the rate of the loss of proficiency, and (B) the assimilation of in-migrants.

- (A) First, Catalonia was able to ‘hibernate’ linguistically for four centuries between the XVIIth and the XIXth centuries (or even immediately after 1939, without its population irretrievably losing the capacity to speak Catalan. As has already been pointed out, Vilar states that ‘it is above all when they most keenly felt this group consciousness that they have refused to forget Catalan’. I believe that their higher level of inter-intelligibility has allowed them to switch to Castilian without ‘forgetting’ Catalan. The same is true of the Franco years,

124. Id:108
125. See Riquer i Permanyer (1991):236
126. See Vilar (1981):573
at the end of which there was a genuine concern among Catalan nationalists for the fate of their language\(^{127}\). Yet the population has been able to resume life in Catalan without major problems, so that the situation is satisfactory today.

In the Basque case, every person lost to Castilian is probably lost forever to Basque, except in the case of an intellectual minority. Thus Arana, the father of modern Basque nationalism, had to learn Basque in his twenties, which entailed a great personal effort. And while the Basque region was the home of three first-level writers of the 1880 literary generation who never spoke Basque (Unamuno, Baroja and Maetzu)\(^{128}\), Catalonia’s artists were able to maintain a fluency in Catalan in spite of speaking Castilian (Dali, Mire, Casals, Tapies...). The cost of bilingualism, and of the passage from one language to the other, is much less in the Catalan than in the Basque case. In Rokkan and Urwin’s words:

‘(in Catalonia) the hurdle between the two languages was not an insurmountable hurdle (...) The linguistic distance and the anger of those who feel obliged to speak in what they consider an utterly alien language is often advanced as a primary explanation of the high level of violence, heightened by the decline of Basque on both sides of the Pyrenees’

- (B) Inter-intelligibility has also played a key role in the assimilation of in-migrants, an issue that hinges upon the very definition of culture and nationality. Thus, for Lancaster\(^{129}\), ‘language is an instrument of cultural assimilation’.

In the Catalan case, in-migrants have been able to communicate with Catalans by simply understanding Catalan, being able to respond in Castilian to their Catalan-speaking interlocutor. For those who have become fluent in Catalan - mainly the second generation - the effort has been much less than it would have been in the Basque region. Moreover, the effort did not create a great sense of frustration or of a loss of identity which might increase the level of violence in the region.

For Basques, language is a ‘two-edged sword’ (the expression is Rokkan and Urwin’s\(^{130}\) in that there is ‘incongruence between it and identity’, since only a minority of ethnic Basques is fluent in Basque. A distant language (from Castilian) has provided a strong sense of distinctiveness to the Basques, but there is now a gap between language and identity that needs to be resolved. Closely linked to this, the lack of inter-intelligibility has kept assimilation of in-migrants very low.

We might add that, in the XXth century, what matters is not the mother tongue but primary school, which plays a vital role in assimilation and perpetuation of a language\(^{131}\). Primary school in Catalonia is taught in Catalan, whereas only a minority of Basques learn Basque at school. Although their proportion is improving, it is still far from reaching Catalan

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127. See interview of Baltasar Porcel by Pi-Sunyer (1971):120

128. See Jauregui (1981):186. The author’s interpretation of this phenomenon is that these writers were confronted to a difficult alternative (either a ‘Basque-rustic’ option, or the ‘Spanish-universal’ one) which forced them into Spanish.

129. See Rokkan/Urwin (1983):151

130. See Lancaster (1987):569

131. See Pi-Sunyer (1985); Pi-Sunyer cites E. Gellner
levels. There is in the Catalan case a ‘linguistic normalization’ project that encompasses the realities of the in-migrants and their children mainly through the school system, a project which encounters general support among nationalists and most of the population and which does not have an equivalent in the Basque case. Catalan nationalists are even starting to foresee the migratory patterns of the 1990s and beyond, when they will have to face an important non-Castilian speaking population from Northern Africa, who will probably be attracted by Spanish over Catalan, in a situation that resembles that of the ‘allophones’ in Québec.

C) In-migration: blessing or disgrace?:

Language is also a reflection of two very different definitions of ethnicity/nationality. Basque definitions of nationality have a very strong primordial element. In Linz’s words:

‘Basque nationalism has a stronger communal ethnocentric dimension directed against denationalization...’

Arana’s neo-racist understanding of Basque belonging certainly is the reflection of a definition of nationality that is strongly primordial, and very different from the Catalan one.

‘Catalan nationalism, with more intellectual than folk roots, centred its nationalism more on language, which ultimately is something that can be acquired. The possibility of assimilation of the immigrant was never excluded, and the strength of the language, both in its daily use and in its literary revival, made Catalan nationalism less defensive and perhaps therefore less aggressive and offensive’

(the underlining is mine)

In spite of ETA’s rejection of race as a basis for Basqueness and its replacement by the commitment to the language and Basque cultural ideals, it can be said that primordialism has permeated and still permeates Basque nationalism to a level unknown in the Catalan movement. Thus, for instance, ETA’s programme shows some ambiguity, and a tension is evident between declarations claiming a voluntaristic conception of the nation (in linguistic terms), which allows for assimilation and the territorial plan to reconquer parts of the

133. Id.:178
134. For a definition of primordialism, see Linz (1985)
135. See Linz (1983):80
136. Id.
137. Interestingly enough, the first time that a Basque nationalist advocates a voluntaristic understanding of the Basque nation is when Francisco de Ulacia responds in 1901 to an article by Joala in which the latter denies the basis of Catalan nationalism because it is founded upon a voluntaristic framework. Ulacia asserts that:

‘Nada importa que un pueblo carezca de fundamento histórico, de personalidad étnica, y de caracteres antropológicos especiales...le bastaría con que quisiera ser libre para tener derecho a serlo’, see Jáuregui (1981):21-2, note number 43

138. See Douglass/Zulaika (1990):244
Basque region that have not been Euskera-speaking for centuries. This is a slip towards an ethnic definition that did not go unnoticed by Jauregui.\(^\text{140}\)

This primordialist element is evident in the inconsistency between ETA's working-class vision and its anti-Spanish strategy, which does not integrate a heavily castilianized working-class\(^\text{141}\), which leads Jauregui to say that ETA does not 'make a connection with the working-class'\(^\text{142}\).

This pattern is linked to different histories of in-migration, which will be the object of a brief presentation. It has already been pointed out that in-migration has played an important role for the prosperity of both regions, a fact not always acknowledged by nationalists. Moreover, the two regions have known different patterns of in-migration. After the end of the XIXth century, and throughout the XXth century, both regions witnessed a quasi-invasion. Urban populations were mainly Castilian-speaking\(^\text{143}\), the countryside remained outside of this pattern. Whilst this came as a shock for both regions, it was hardly a novelty for Catalonia, which had a strong tradition of in-migration, especially from France and the rest of Spain\(^\text{144}\). This, combined with the variable of inter-intelligibility, has certainly played a role in the different outcomes in integration and assimilation of the two regions.

The difference could be summarized as follows: (a) the Basque region had no tradition of in-migration, and (b) had/has a conception of nationality that was not geared towards integrating outsiders. Basque nationalists and ETA never fully resolved the double tension Spain/Euzkadi, autochthones/in-migrants, something which Catalan nationalists have been able to do.

D) History: the legacy of violence

The last set of explanations of these different developments concerns the historical trend of violence. This can obviously not be taken as an independent variable to explain why violence occurs. Yet the cumulative history of violence may play a role in keeping violence going when the institutional situation might call for more peaceful means of channelling nationalist activism. I believe that this has been the case for the Basque region after 1975.

It must be pointed out that violence in the Basque region has been both internecine and external. In Da Silva and Douglass's words\(^\text{145}\)

'with the exception of the short-lived reign of Sancho El Mayor from the 1000 to 1035, political organization in the Basque country showed a tendency for fragmentation and internecine warfare'

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139. See Jáuregui (1981):375
140. Id:374,134
141. Id:99-101
142. Id:180,187
144. See Sahlins (1989)
145. See Douglass/Da Silva (1971):152
In spite of this tendency to internal division, Basques have always united to react to external violence, in the form of invasions since the Romans, or as standing armies of occupation after the Carlist wars in the XIXth century and the civil war in the XXth, without mentioning harsh linguistic and cultural repression. This surely accounts for violence in the Basque region. Yet Catalonia also experienced invasions, armies of occupation and harsh repression without knowing the same level of violence. It is here that we need to turn to a study of ETA's own goals, structure and actions, to understand violence in the Basque region.

* * *

The existence of a terrorist organization such as ETA deserves comprehensive research in itself, of which only the most salient aspects can be presented here. As Douglass/Zulaika posit 146:

'It is (...) important to recognize that ETA differs from all the other political organizations within the Basque political spectrum. ETA is uncompromising in principle, whereas compromise is generic to the conventional political process, particularly within democracies'.

There are strong difficulties in explaining ETA's goals and existence within the Spanish cadre, according to Jauregui 147. First, he points out its historical immediacy. Also, France's regime made it impossible to conduct any open research on the matter. Third and finally, Basque nationalism, as well as other peripheral nationalisms, are interpreted from the established-state's point of view. We may add that established states are often the result of strategies that resemble those of ETA 148. Thus anyone studying ETA's actions would be kept from a neutral point of view; one could consider that, in the same way as the use of a certain theoretical or normative framework entails certain limits and constraints for the observer 149, the 'established-state' situation of most observers is also an impediment to 'neutral' observation 150.

Among the reasons that are put forth to explain ETA's important features, we can emphasize the following: First, the harsh repression by the Franco regime. This prompted, second, a state of forced clandestine existence from the very beginning. Also, the intellectual inheritance of Arana, with its racist and intolerant connotations. Finally, the anti-communism of the Basque society, forcing an organization of its kind to clandestine action. Finally, the example of nationalist liberation movements in the third world 151. Jauregui also mentions the reluctance of the Spanish population, due to the fresh memories of civil war, to engage in anything that can be considered as 'political activities' 152.

146. See Douglass/Zulaika (1990):251

147. Certainly, from the English point of view at the time, the Boston Tea Party was an act of terrorism, The same holds true for the Terreur period during the French Revolution, or the crushing of peripheral nationalisms and their 'patois' languages. The examples are countless.

148. See Jauregui (1981):1


150. See Douglass/Zulaika

151. See Jauregui (1981):195; for data on repression, see:204

152. Id:217
Of the variables which are posited, we can see that repression, fear of political activism and anti-communism were of the same nature in Catalonia, as well as the examples of the third world. And certainly, repression, anti-communism and fear of political activities have disappeared after 1975, yet violence in the Basque region continues.

The inheritance of Arana’s ideas, upholding a racial definition of the Basque nation that has no counterpart in Catalonia, is an element particular to the Basque case, which is necessary to understand violence.

Another variable that I believe to be crucial in the Basque case, one which Jauregui mentions repeatedly in his book as a circumstance in which ETA was born, and not a reason for its existence, is the sense of urgency and the need for action: due to the low degree of inter-intelligibility, Basque is rightly perceived by nationalists as a language in the process of extinction, and the Basque nation with it. In this aspect, inter-intelligibility plays a direct role in violence in the Basque case.

The sense of urgency gives all the variables posited above by Jauregui their full meaning: the Basque case is seen as more ‘urgent’ by Basque nationalists than the Catalan one by Catalan nationalists, and urgency remains even after France’s death: the rate of extinction of the Basque language is no different today than it was during France’s rule.

Racist undertones, which I have attempted to show, in the form of incoherence or ambiguities in ETA’s programmes, also contribute to this sense of ‘urgency’: whether a marriage between a (racially) Basque and a non-Basque take place under Franco or under a democratic state, it is still perceived as a loss for the Basque race if one takes this view.

Apart from the need to explain the existence of ETA, I also argue that ETA autonomously contributes to violence in the Basque region. Thus, ETA is not only a result of a situation of violence, but also contributes to violence because its own existence is dependent upon violence: an organization that deals with weapons-trade, drug-trafficking, and that controls banks, certainly has every interest in making unacceptable demands, the negative outcome of which will in turn mean that the organization has a reason to act and, to exist. Also, as Douglass and Zuleika show ETA’s uncompromising nature means that anything short of immediate independence will entail the continuation of violent activities. ETA’s international

153. See Jauregui (1981):93:

‘Hay que evitar por todos los medios que Euzkadi muera, y para ello se impone una doble obligación: la lucha para no perder la personalidad vasca, y la lucha para derrocar al tirano’.

A la situación limite en que se halla el ‘alma vasca’ hay que oponer también soluciones limite:

(He cites an article in Zutik) “ETA ha elegido el camino del deber, el camino de la resistencia hasta el fin Que todos los vascos sepan que ha llegado el momento de la clasificacion en heroes y traidores. Hundiremos lo que haya que hundir. Ni la situación de Euzkadi. ni el secreto martirio de nuestros presos permiten otra alternativa”

154. In this sense, inter-intelligibility plays a direct role in the level of violence. I hope to do more research on this issue in the future.

155. See before, pp.38.9
financial sources mean that, no matter how much the population of the Basque region (basques and non-Basques) reject its tactics through demonstrations, polls, votes, etc., as has been the case, it will not cease to exist. ETA has an autonomous life.

In the words of Rokkan and Urwin:

‘The existence of a clandestine military tradition dating back to violent historical events seems to be more important than contemporary characteristics of the communities: ETA and IRA have more in common with each other than with the Basque and Northern Irish communities. Overall, violence is more likely where there seems to be little or no support for the policy (...): it is very much a policy of last resort’

Finally, it is surprising that the role of hatred and vengeance has not been more examined: ETA’s intransigence might be (in part) the result of centuries of frustration by Basque nationalists, which produces some resort to vengeance for its own sake. Thus, even if they perceive that the Basque nation is doomed to disappear, they will resort to revenge in the form of terrorism.

The French counter-example

A short mention of the situation of Basque and Catalan nationalisms within the French state should be made here. In the same manner as the Catalan region in France has not experienced major autonomist or nationalist movements, there has been no violence in the French Basque region. This situation deserves more research of the sort that Lancaster conducted on the Basques in both France and Spain, and is pointed out by Jauregui as deserving more attention and as a promising field to understand violence in the Basque region.

One reason that comes to mind immediately is that the (Spanish) Basque nationalists needed the neutrality of France in order to act in Spain, their main theatre of operations. For the French state, this was a way of deflating the problem within its borders, by allowing the Basque nationalist movement, and subsequently ETA, to operate from its territory, and incorporate (French) Basque nationalists for its actions in Spain (and not in France, as would otherwise have been the case). This is certainly surprising, on at least two counts: First, Basque nationalism, following Arana’s tradition, was to be directed against both states. In this sense, there is probably a certain amount of ‘free-riding’ of French Basque nationalists: instead of fighting at home, they have encouraged the fight on the Spanish side. This is evident today with linguistic rights, with many French Basques and Catalans crossing over the border to receive courses in the Basque or Catalan language instead of pressing for further rights in France. Second, the Basque nationalists had a deep admiration towards the Algerian FLN, while operating peacefully in France. For Jauregui, this is a proof that the

156. See Rokkan/Urwin (1983):150
157. See Lancaster (1987)
158. See Jáuregui (1981):213
159. Id.
main reason for violence in the Spanish Basque region is mainly France's repressive regime, something that I believe to be partially untrue, as the Catalan case and the evolution since 1975-78 suggest.

**Outcomes: the options for the Basques**

The Basque region presents a blocked situation, almost to the level of the one that prevails in Northern Ireland. A quick presentation of the means to unblock such a situation includes the need for the Basque nationalists to analyze the relationship between language and ethnicity. Two options come to mind: first, they could dramatically increase the level of proficiency of the population in Basque. This signifies that, in addition to the ethnically Basque population, every means to attract the in-migrants has to be found and put into practice. On the other hand, de-linking language and Basqueness would be a possible option. This would entail a definition of Basqueness which is not unlike the one in Ireland or Wales, where English is now the language spoken by the population, which still feels profoundly Irish or Welsh.

In any case, Basque nationalists and the Spanish state are faced with a blocked situation that needs new options to be taken, apart from the problem posed by ETA in economic and social terms.

A new model of the national reality is needed in the Basque case. The reality of the integration of in-migrants has to be addressed differently than has been the case to this day. Two options come to mind: either integration of the foreign population - and a good part of the ethnic Basque one - is proposed by a series of incentives of the type of the 'language games' referred to above. Also, a framework for bilingualism and multiculturalism could be worked out which allows the Basque language to be maintained, and perhaps its use increased, while Castilian-speakers are allowed to conduct their life in Castilian. This would be similar to the Welsh case in that some areas of Welsh-speakers are 'protected' by the (English-speaking) Welsh population at large, who feel that a valuable part of their heritage is alive in those areas. This potion certainly entails a danger for the survival of Basque, and yet deserves to be explored.

Finally, the crux of the problem may also lie in a generational change: in the same way as in the late 50s when ETA's sense of urgency and action replaced a decaying and demoralized Basque nationalist movement, or in the late XIXth century, when Arana's modern nationalism filled the vacuum left after the Carlist wars by a stagnant Carlist Party, ETA's generation will have to be replaced. That might be the opportunity for young Basque nationalists, who grew up under democratic rule and have been able to compare their region's fate to that of Catalonia or Québec, to become the dynamic portion of the Basque nation.

160. See Laitin (1988)
162. For the Irish case, see Rowthorn and Wayne, Northern Ireland; for Wales: Williams (1983)
163. See Jáuregui (1981):378
CONCLUSION

It appears therefore that the main similarities among the two regions lie, first, in their historical evolution with the Castilian core, although Catalonia has enjoyed more independence. Second, the economic situation of the two regions as a whole could be defined as the opposite of Hechter's 'internal colonies'. Thirdly, massive in-migration has evidently allowed them to industrialize while having a heavy cultural impact.

Yet the differences also stand out. Internal economic structures are a key issue in explaining the differences and similarities between the two regions: the role of ownership structure, opposing a predominantly Catalan middle-class bourgeoisie in Catalonia and a large industrial elite narrowly linked to Madrid in the Basque region account for many developments and deserve to be further studied. The role of the Catholic Church in also a variable to be reckoned with.

Yet this paper has focused mainly upon other differences, which could be divided in three sections. The cultural-linguistic variables include inter-intelligibility (much greater in Catalonia than in the Basque region), and language-standardization before the industrial revolution (more complete in Catalonia). Language plays a key role in the assimilation of immigrants. Second, a history of internal violence has played a greater role in the Basque region that in Catalonia. Finally, the existence of a structured, autonomous Basque terrorist organization has no counterpart in Catalonia.

The result has been a more constructive and successful evolution towards autonomy in Catalonia since 1975, whereas the outlook for the Basque region is, at best, mixed. Basque nationalists are now confronted with the need of drawing up a different strategy, probably accepting (at least momentarily) that Basque has not become a means of mass communication in their region, and has acted as a deterrent to the assimilation of immigrants. Perhaps this would entail, in Linz's words, a passage from 'primordialism to nationalism' by fully assuming a territorial definition of Basqueness. Whether this will suppose a solution like the Irish one, where language has been lost but independence acquired, remains to be seen.

The Catalan case brings to mind the evolution of Quebec, whereas the Basque example has a parallel in the Irish one. A comparison of these cases, this time outside a common institutional structure such as the Spanish state, would certainly uncover interesting findings towards the understanding of violence. Finally, a study of the Basque and Catalan cases should be undertaken on a 'cross-comparative' basis, by introducing the French regions of the two ethnic groups: this would allow for a (set of) comparative study(s) where variables are controlled both at the ethnic level as Lancaster proposes and at the institutional one (in both cases, Spanish' and 'French' variables could be detected).

165. See Linz (1973):69-73
166. Id.
167. See Linz (1985)
169. See Lancaster (1987) 563-4
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